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The Contemporary Security Vetting Landscape 
 
Paul F Scott 





It was reported, in September 2018, that Iram Awan, Private Secretary to the leader of Her 
Majesty’s Opposition, had not been granted a pass to enter the Parliamentary estate despite having 
applied for one many months previously – though the pass had not been refused, and no 
explanation for the unusually long delay had been offered.1 It soon transpired that a second senior 
figure close to the leader of the opposition was in a similar situation, with both accessing the estate 
using passes issued to visitors.2 The incident – and suggestions by one of those affected that it was 
part of a ‘deep-state’ conspiracy3 – resulted in an unusual degree of attention to the question of 
security vetting: the practice of assessing – either negatively or positively – those whose 
employment may place them in a position to do to harm to the security of the state, which has 
taken place in the United Kingdom on a formal basis since the immediately post-war period (and 
perhaps longer in a less formal fashion).4 There is much to be concerned with about the idea that 
Her Majesty’s Government (or some proxy for it) might have the ability to prevent Her Majesty’s 
Opposition from playing its constitutional role, either by regulating who can be employed to assist 
it or even – which in practice may be the same thing – regulating the ability of a person so chosen 
to enter his or her place of work. Ultimately, however, Awan was granted a Parliamentary pass, 
and so the issues remained one of mere inconvenience. In early 2019, however, another such 
incident – this one far more concerning – came to light. Eric King, a noted expert on legal and 
technical issues around state surveillance, had been denied the security clearance that he needed in 
order to take up the post as head of investigations at the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s 
Office, created by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.5 The refusal – based, it was claimed, not on 
King’s own conduct or status, but rather on his past associations – was made by the Home Office, 
the department which is the subject of much of the oversight carried out by IPCO.6 The overseen 
had, in effect, exercised a veto over its overseers. What both these examples suggest is that, after 
an extended period in which the question of national security vetting has been largely absent from 
politics, the tide may be turning. The time is therefore ripe for a consideration of such law and 
practice, and its many limitations – one which addresses not only to the ‘classic’ form of vetting, 
relating to those who work, directly or indirectly, for the executive branch of the state, but which 
considers vetting holistically so as to permit, for example, alongside the consideration of how 
vetting works also a consideration of who is not vetted, and why not. 
 
In a modern environment in which issues of security are ever more prominent, and more 
and more of what was once done informally or unofficially – or certainly without the appropriate 
statutory backing – is now formalised both in law and in practice, it is perhaps surprising that not 
only has the legal element of the security vetting process not been similarly rationalised, but that 
there has been little or no pressure on the United Kingdom to do so. This article argues for such 
rationalisation, not (merely) for the sake of the rule of law-type considerations which arise where 
there is no clear legal authority or limitation upon the process, but rather because, as it aims to 
show, fundamental issues about vetting – who is vetted, how they are vetted, why they are vetted 
– appear never to have been considered in a systematic fashion. To place the matter on a statutory 
footing would provide an opportunity to carry out such a consideration, and to ensure that those 
accidents of history which the vetting landscape reflects are smoothed over so far as is practically 
possible. If the result of such a process is less vetting, then – in light of the ever-present possibility 
that the vetting process might be abused for more or less directly political ends – then so much 
the better.   
 
2. The rise and fall of politics in vetting 
 
2.1 A short history of vetting 
 
In the post-war years,7 Attlee announced that Communists and Fascists would be barred from 
work which was ‘vital to the security of the State’, with any individual to whom it was decided this 
rules should apply being made subject to what became known as the ‘purge procedure’.8 This 
involved the disclosure of the nature of allegations to the civil servant (to the extent compatible 
with state security) and then, if the allegation was maintained following written representations, an 
oral hearing before the ‘Three Advisors’ – more colloquially, the ‘Three Wise Men’ – who reported 
to the relevant Minister. Once the Advisors had reported, the civil servant could make further 
representations, but the final decision belonged to the Minister, and would usually involve the 
redeployment of the civil servant in question.9 A prospective procedure – known as ‘positive 
vetting’ – was introduced in 1952,10 and in 1956 it was made clear that not only might political 
views (almost invariably Communist sympathies)11 bar a person from sensitive employment, but 
that so might what were euphemistically referred to as ‘character defects’.12 Where the latter was 
the basis of the suspicion against him, however, the ‘purge procedure’ did not apply. Not only was 
there no ‘appeal’ to the Advisors, but the nature of the suspicion was not usually communicated. 
Between 1948 and 1954 there were 124 dismissals.13 In the early 1960s, the government – 
responding to a number of convictions under the Official Secrets Acts which had taken place in 
the preceding years – charged an independent Committee with a review of ‘security procedures 
and practices in the public service’.14 The Committee made a number of recommendations in this 
area, but did not argue for the wholesale reform of arrangements which it said had ‘grown 
piecemeal’ over time.15  
 
In the early 1980s, a further review was carried out by the Security Commission at the 
request of the Prime Minister – at the general level rather than, as was usually the case with the 
Commission’s work, in response to some specific security-related incident.16 The report was not 
published, and so its contents are discernible only from the government’s response, 17 which 
describes it as portraying a similar external threat to that which had existed at the time of the 
previous report, but an evolving internal one. A fall in the membership of the Communist Party 
of Great Britain was offset against ‘the proliferation of new subversive groups of the extreme Left 
and extreme Right (mainly the former) whose aim is to overthrow democratic parliamentary 
government in this country by violent or other unconstitutional means’ including via terrorism. 
Also significant was the emergence of technology in government: 
  
The Commission does not doubt that this trend will continue and indeed accelerate with 
continuing developments in computer technology and will bring in its train new security 
problems, which themselves will not stay static, in the safeguarding of classified 
information made accessible at the terminals of large central computers or stored in mini-
computers or on floppy discs or other forms of storage used for word processing 
machines.18 
 
The Commission recommended a review both of the underlying system of classification of 
material and the retention of the positive vetting system, though with an attempt made to reduce 
the number of posts to which it applied, suggesting both Under-Secretaries and those working in 
the private offices of Ministers below Cabinet rank as those in relation to whom PV might not be 
necessary. It also recommended a softening of the approach to one of the key ‘character defects’ 
which had been caught by vetting in the past, saying that from then on in the (home) Civil Service, 
‘male homosexual inclinations or relationships should not necessarily be treated as an absolute bar 
to PV clearance’. Instead, they ‘should be dealt with on a case by case basis, paying particular 
attention to whether the way in which the individual has indulged his homosexual tendencies casts 
any doubt upon his discretion or reliability.’19 The Chairman of the Three Advisers was to be a 
judge. More amendments were recommended in and following the Security Commission’s report 
on possible security breaches related to the circumstances in which Geoffrey Prime, a GCHQ 
linguist, was convicted both of offences under the Official Secrets Act and a series of indecent 
assaults on young girls,20 including the introduction of a more rigorous form of positive vetting, 
known as ‘enhanced positive vetting’. Further changes were introduced in 1985 and were 
announced – if that is not too strong a term – via the statement, in a written answer by the Prime 
Minister, that ‘the terms of reference of the three advisers and the statement of procedure have 
been revised.’21 
 
A new vetting policy was introduced in 1990.22 It excluded from employment ‘in 
connection with work the nature of which is vital to the security of the state’ any person who: 
  
(a) is, or has been, involved in, or associated with any of the following activities threatening 
national security: 
1. (i) espionage, 
2. (ii) terrorism, 
3. (iii) sabotage, 
4. (iv) actions intended to overthrow or undermine Parliamentary democracy by 
political, industrial or violent means; or 
(b) is, or has recently been, a member of any organisation which has advocated such 
activities; or 
(c) is, or has recently been, associated with any such organisation, or any of its members, 
in such a way as to raise reasonable doubts about his or her reliability; or 
(d) is susceptible to pressure from any such organisation or from a foreign intelligence 
service or a hostile power; or 
(e) suffers from defects of character which may expose him or her to blackmail or other 
influence by any such organisation or by a foreign intelligence service or which may 
otherwise indicate unreliability.23 
 
The question of vetting in the civil service attracts less attention in recent years. Though there are 
still occasional prosecutions under the Official Secrets Acts, these now often relate to action taken 
for ethical reasons. The phenomenon of foreign powers recruiting ordinary civil servants to carry 
out espionage has either largely lapsed or simply does not result in any publicity. Certainly, the 
Security Commission, which was usually the body charged with considering the lessons of the 
most serious of security breaches,24 has been moribund for many years.25 Its last report – relating 
to the vetting of those employed in the Royal Household – was published in 2004.26  
 
2.2 The changing politics of vetting 
 
Security vetting – even if recognised as a ‘necessary evil’27 – attracts suspicion because, as is already 
evident from the foregoing discussion, the line between those with strong political views and those 
who are a threat to state security is not always a clear one. There is therefore a concern that the 
process has been or might be used so as to effectively debar from employment those whose 
political positions are considered intolerable by those charged with making decisions about 
vetting.28 We see this danger, for example, in the definition of ‘subversion’ at work. The original 
understanding of the term derived from Lord Denning’s report into the Profumo affair. Denning 
emphasised the need to understand the role of the Security Services, which was strictly confined 
to the defence of the realm:  
 
They are not to be used so as to pry into any man’s private conduct, or business affairs: or 
even into his political opinions, except in so far as they are subversive, that is, they would 
contemplate the overthrow of the Government by unlawful means.29 
 
The reference to the lawfulness of the means, however, was officially dropped in 1985 (having 
been unofficially discarded a decade earlier).30 Those who were to be kept away from sensitive 
material and places became, in time, those who – alongside those involved in traditional threats to 
the security of the state, such as terrorism or espionage – had been involved in or associated with 
‘actions intended to overthrow or undermine Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or 
violent means.’31 In practice, vetting was almost invariably aimed at those on the left of the political 
spectrum rather than those on the right.32 The Radcliffe report focussed upon the threat posed by 
the CPGB, and Hennessy and Brownfeld report that, in the early years of the process, the 
authorities ‘were overjoyed when they eventually found a fascist in one of the service departments. 
It made the whole operation look genuinely even-handed’.33 In the mid-1950s the Security 
Commission could barely bring itself to pretend that it regarded both extremes as equal threats: 
 
At one time the Fascist ideology also presented considerable security risks. Although to-
day the chief risk is that presented by Communism, the security arrangements instituted in 
1948 were directed, and will continue to be directed, against Communism and Fascism 
alike. In this paper for convenience and brevity the term “Communism” is used to cover 
Communism and Fascism alike.34 
 
Even when the CBGP began to dwindle, there was an evident unwillingness to discuss the matter 
without emphasising that the left was the greater threat: 
 
The fall in CPGB membership, however, has been accompanied by the proliferation of 
new subversive groups of the extreme Left and extreme Right (mainly the former) whose 
aim is to overthrow democratic parliamentary government in this country by violent or 
other unconstitutional means, not shrinking in the case of the most extreme groups from 
terrorism to achieve their aims.35 
 
The wider sense of subversion introduced in the 1980s is still present in the current process, 
though the word itself is not used. The form those undergoing developed vetting are required to 
complete asks those completing it if they have ever been involved in actions ‘intended to 
overthrow or undermine Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means’ or been 
a member or supporter of a group involved in such activities.36 Even this is accepted as the correct 
place at which to draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate political activity (and there is of 
course far more to the vetting system than this one question), it is useful to remember that, as the 
examples given in the introduction make clear, and as is discussed further below, vetting does not 
apply only to those who are employed by the state itself in whatever form – directly or indirectly 
– but also to a range of others, some in the domain of politics rather than administration. For 
many years, however – roughly, say, from the placing of MI5 on the statute book in 1989 (or at 
least when the litigation relating to the matter ceased a few years later) until some time after 2010 
– the vetting process had little political salience. The practice of vetting employees of the BBC, for 
example, diminished though the 1980s.37 Internationally, the fall of the Soviet Union and, 
domestically, the dominance of New Labour’s third way, appear to have dampened down the 
ideological contestation of the prior decades, or at least displaced it from those fora to which 
vetting has or might apply.38 Because vetting was less politically salient, so too was the quality of 
the vetting process and the presence (or absence) of suitable safeguards, both of which were 
relevant in contexts – primarily that of international (as opposed to ‘domestic’) terrorism – which 
neither had nor aspired to have footholds in the domestic political institutions.  
 
As the examples with which this article opened suggest, however, this interlude may now 
have come or be coming to an end. A number of reasons for this shift, which is perhaps best 
understood as a regression to the mean, might be suggested. The pivot to the left of the Labour 
Party – a pivot encapsulated by, but hardly limited to, the figure of Jeremy Corbyn – has brought 
back into the political mainstream the sorts of ideas and individuals that would once upon a time 
have no doubt been caught up in some of the more enthusiastic purging carried out in the name 
of national security. Another change, however – exemplified by the travails of Eric King – is more 
interesting, because less obviously redolent of the past. King, like many others, is prominent in the 
discourse due to his work with or connections to a number of NGOs which resist what is seen as 
the expansion of the national security state and, in particular, its surveillance capacities: Liberty, 
Big Brother Watch, Privacy International etc, along with a number of others, international and 
transnational. What is distinctive about this group of organisations and the ideals which they 
pursue is that they cut across the traditional left-right spectrum insofar as it is predicated upon 
attitudes towards economics. Moreover, the sorts of oversight roles which King was unable to take 
up because of an adverse vetting decision are a feature of the modern national security constitution: 
even for many years after the emergence of a modern national security constitution in the mid-
1980s all oversight was carried out by senior judges, either acting along (as one of the 
Commissioners) or on one of the Tribunals set up to determine legal questions. If there is a certain 
suspicion felt in regard to those belonging to or associated with these privacy-oriented groups, 
therefore, it would seem to have no direct analogue within the older use (or misuse) of vetting for 
political reasons, though of course there is good reason to believe that the United Kingdom has 
previously employed its national security capacities against civil liberties advocates.39 Whatever the 
explanation for the renewed salience of security vetting (if that is indeed what is happening) it is 
clear that the time is ripe to consider the practice in the round. 
 
3. Vetting today  
 
3.1 The legal context 
 
As will be seen below, vetting is not formalised in law: unlike in some other Commonwealth states, 
there is no statute which governs the process nor its results, and so it would seem that the fact that 
a person has undergone, say, developed vetting is a purely administrative one. Nevertheless, the 
law of course frames the question of access to secret information, and vetting, in a number of 
ways, to deal with which in full is beyond the scope of this paper. The most important set of rules 
are those in the Official Secrets Act 1989, which contains a number of offences relating to the 
disclosure of official information. Section 1(1) of the Act applies to those who are or have been ‘a 
member of the security and intelligence services’ or ‘a person notified that he is subject to the 
provisions of this subsection’. It makes it an offence to disclose without lawful authority ‘any 
information, document or other article relating to security or intelligence which is or has been in 
his possession by virtue of his position as a member of any of those services or in the course of 
his work while the notification is or was in force.’40 The result is that, though it is common to 
notify persons that the Official Secrets Acts apply to them, such notification (‘signing the Official 
Secrets Act’) is not a general precondition of the commission of the offences. Notification, the 
Act provides, ‘shall be effected by a notice in writing served on him by a Minister of the Crown’ 
and may be served if ‘in the Minister’s opinion, the work undertaken by the person in question is 
or includes work connected with the security and intelligence services and its nature is such that 
the interests of national security require that he should be subject to the provisions of that 
subsection.’41 Notification lasts for five years, but is renewable.42  
 
A related offence, which however requires that the disclosure in question must be 
‘damaging’43 applies to Crown servants and government contractors, and exists alongside 
equivalent offences relating to the disclosure of material damaging to defence and international 
relations.44 The concept of a ‘Crown servant’ for the purposes of the Act is broad: it includes 
Ministers, and members of the devolved administrations (though see the peculiarities of the 
Northern Ireland position), ‘any person employed in the civil service of the Crown, including Her 
Majesty’s Diplomatic Service, Her Majesty’s Overseas Civil Service, the civil service of Northern 
Ireland and the Northern Ireland Court Service’, ‘any member of the naval, military or air forces 
of the Crown’ and ‘any constable and any other person employed or appointed in or for the 
purposes of any police force’.45 It also includes those whose are so prescribed by an order made 
by the Secretary of State.46 ‘Government contractor’ is also subject to an expansive definition, 
being derivative of the definition of ‘Crown servant’.47 The effect, in short, is that the OSA offences 
will apply to most, perhaps all, of those subject to security vetting and – in the case, for example, 
of Minsters of the Crown – some who are not.  
 
3.2 Forms of vetting 
 
Vetting policy in the United Kingdom is set by the Cabinet Office.48 Vetting is now carried out 
(mostly) by a single body,49 United Kingdom Security Vetting, which replaced the separate bodies 
which had themselves been set up in order to bring consistency to a process that had until relatively 
recently been carried out at the level of independent departments.50 Around 170,000 cases were 
considered in the 2017-18.51 All those who have access to ‘government’ assets must meet the 
‘Baseline Personnel Security Standard’, involving the provision of proof of identity, confirmation 
of employment history, nationality and immigration status, and disclosure of unspent criminal 
convictions.52 This has no special application to the national security context – where it is 
considered necessary and proportionate, additional national security vetting will be carried out,53 
the nature of such vetting being linked to the system of classification of assets and material as 
SECRET or TOP SECRET.54  There are three forms of such national security vetting.55  
 
The first, ‘counter-terrorism check’ (‘CTC’), is carried out on those whose employment 
involves ‘proximity to public figures assessed to be at particular risk from terrorist attack’, given 
them access to ‘information or material assessed to be of value to terrorists’ or involves ‘unescorted 
access to certain military, civil, industrial or commercial establishments assessed to be at particular 
risk from terrorist attack.’56 Those undergoing a CTC will be required to complete the Security 
Questionnaire – an intimidating form requiring disclosure of a vast range of personal information, 
including those relating to the applicant’s relationship history, her family, her employment history, 
medical information, and financial history, as well as what is described as ‘security information’, 
which the form notes will be ‘checked against national security records’.57 Checks will be made of 
departmental records, spent and unspent criminal records, and MI5 files and, as with all forms of 
national security vetting, ‘may extend to third parties included on the security questionnaire.’58 The 
second, progressively more onerous, form of national security vetting is a ‘Security Check’ (‘SC’), 
carried out on those involved in posts which require them to have ‘long-term, frequent and 
uncontrolled access to SECRET assets and/or occasional, supervised access to TOP SECRET 
assets’.59 In addition to what is involved in CTC, an SC will involve the checking of ‘credit and 
financial history with a credit reference agency’; where there are ‘unresolved financial concerns’, a 
person undergoing an SC ‘may also be required to complete a separate Financial Questionnaire so 
that a full review of personal finances can be carried out.’60 The third, and most intrusive, form of 
national security vetting is ‘Developed Vetting’ (‘DV’), which is carried out on those who are 
employed in posts which require them ‘to have frequent and uncontrolled access to TOP SECRET 
assets or require any access to TOP SECRET codeword material.’61 As well as completing a 
Security Questionnaire, those undergoing DV must complete a ‘DV supplement’ and a Financial 
Questionnaire. Additional checks include a ‘full review of personal finances’ (including ‘an 
assessment of an individual’s assets, liabilities, income and expenditure both on an individual basis 
and taking into account the joint position with a spouse or partner’) and a ‘detailed interview 
conducted by a trained Investigating Officer’.62 A person’s referees will also be interviewed within 
the DV process,63 which UKSV estimates takes ‘32 times more effort to complete than one CTC 
or SC case’.64 In all cases, the clearance attaches to the person, and can be transferred from one 
post to another. Clearances must, however, be renewed periodically, whether or not the holder has 
changed post.65  
 
The key feature of the vetting regime is that it is based not upon the status of the individual 
being vetted – the identity of the employer, whether state or non-state, or the characterisation of 
the post in which he or she is employed – but rather functional matters such as access to locations 
or material. One effect of this approach is that a large number of individuals who are not directly 
employed by any emanation of the state are subject to vetting. Mostly these will be, for example, 
contractors working in a defence context, but the example of Iram Awan shows that a functional 
approach may capture those who work in political roles. Secondly, and conversely, a functional 
approach sits uneasily with the modern democratic constitution. Many of those who sit at the heart 
of the state – judges, politicians etc – enjoy the sort of access to places and information which 
would normally see them subject to the highest level of vetting and yet, as the next section 
discusses, are not in fact vetted. 
 
3.3 Who is vetted? 
 
In its application to civil servants and the contractors performing tasks on behalf of or alongside 
the civil service, the logic of the application of vetting processes seems uncontroversial, assuming 
– as perhaps we should not – that political considerations can be strictly separated from those 
relating to security. But the executive is not of course apolitical in its entirety, and there is no logical 
reason why vetting could not stray beyond the executive into political or even judicial branches of 
state. How far that is the case is difficult to say, for there seems to never have been any sustained 
consideration of the matter. Members of Parliament are not, it is clear, security vetted. Rodney 
Brazier points out that they ‘do not, in the ordinary run of parliamentary business, have access to 
information which could be useful to an unfriendly state, so that if they were blackmailed the state 
would not be exposed to harm.’66 This point predates, however, the creation of the Intelligence 
and Security Committee of Parliament, members of which do have such access. It is notable, 
therefore, that members of the ISC are not subject to vetting, 67 notwithstanding that – if security 
were the only consideration – there would seem to be a basis for doing so. That they are not, that 
is, indicates that security is not the only relevant consideration. There exists also an important 
democratic principle, whereby the security and intelligence agencies (‘SIAs’) should not have a role 
in determining the suitability of those to whom they – like the rest of the state – are accountable, 
and that principle is strong enough to overcome the threat which is created when member of the 
ISC are granted access to sensitive material. Nevertheless, it remains possible – perhaps likely – 
that, as with Ministers of the Crown (discussed below), some sort of informal or unofficial vetting 
takes place, and there remains the possibility that the SIAs (most probably MI5) have some – 
indirect and attenuated – role in determining who it is, or is not, that is charged with carrying out 
oversight of them. If so, then the lack of formal vetting is positively misleading. 
 
Ministers are not vetted, though – unlike in the case of Members of Parliament generally 
– there has been serious discussion of the possibility in the past.68 The Security Commission 
addressed this question as part of a report it produced in the early 1980s, noting that not only may 
a Minister be a risk, but that it had been in the previous decade ‘driven to that conclusion in the 
case of a junior Minister on the grounds of character defects’.69 The Minister in question was Lord 
Lambton: in its earlier report, the Commission had concluded that his behaviour of was such that, 
had it continued, it would ‘compelled’ it to recommend that he ‘be denied further access to 
classified information.’70 It nevertheless concluded, both then and a decade later, that vetting of 
Ministers should not take place: 
  
The Commission recognises, however, that the way in which ministerial posts are filled 
upon a change of government makes it impracticable to subject Ministers to PV clearance 
before appointment and probably politically unacceptable to invite them to co-operate in 
PV clearance procedures in respect of themselves after appointment…71  
 
It is striking, in retrospect, that the question of practicability is privileged over that of democratic 
principle within this account.72 Since then, Rodney Brazier is one of the few to have considered 
the point. Starting from the premise that Ministers might ‘receive the most secret and sensitive 
information about defence and international relations’ or ‘be made aware of information relating 
to the economic well-being of the state’ Brazier notes that they as much as civil servants ‘would 
be in a position to help the enemies of the state, and could thereby threaten national interests and 
even national security’: 
 
Logically, and quite properly, steps should be taken to screen people before they were 
appointed to such important positions. Such steps are taken in relation to civil servants: 
Ministers are, however, exempt from them.73 
 
This, though, is not quite the full story. In the same report in which the Security Commission 
recommended against the vetting of Ministers it acknowledged that ‘effective arrangements exist 
for drawing to the attention of the Prime Minister of the day any relevant security information 
which may have reached the Security Service about those whom he is likely to wish to appoint to 
Ministerial office’ and that ‘the Government Chief Whip of the day can be expected to be very 
well informed about any member of either House of Parliament who is a potential candidate for 
Ministerial office’.74 That is, formal vetting was felt unnecessary because a sort of unofficial system 
of vetting was in place. Such unofficial processes, whether or not they rise to the level of what we 
might call informal vetting, may well counter or even entirely exclude the possibility that a person 
who for one reason or another poses a threat to security finds him or herself in Ministerial office. 
They have, however, a number of obvious downsides. Chief amongst them for Brazier was that 
informal vetting was likely to have an arbitrary dimension: ‘the individual concerned… would then 
be exposed to an intrusive examination of his life which most other Ministers are spared, and 
about which he might well remain ignorant.’75 Brazier therefore put forward – if hesitantly – a case 
for abandoning the implied distinction between civil servants and ministers in the vetting process:76 
 
No Minister, it is true, has ever been identified publicly as a traitor, but then potential 
treason is not the only risk. Over the years several Ministers have had to resign when their 
unacceptable private behaviour or character defects or potential as blackmail victims have 
been exposed, or have been threatened to be exposed - and those are the very criteria 
which bar civil servants from secret work. Had those factors been known before those 
Ministers had been appointed, they would not, presumably, have been given office.77 
 
More significant, however, is that unofficial vetting of this sort is perhaps even more 
democratically objectionable than is a formalised vetting of Ministers: the SIAs enjoy an ability to 
influence the composition of Her Majesty’s Government, but without that fact being 
acknowledged, and without the process enjoying democratic legitimacy. Also relevant here is that 
all members of the Cabinet are members of the Privy Council – of which, strictly speaking, the 
Cabinet is but a committee. All will, therefore, have taken the Privy Council oath, by which a 
Counsellor is bound to ‘keep secret all Matters committed and revealed unto you’.78 
 
Judges are not vetted. They are, however, deemed to be vetted. This is necessary, as judges 
are called upon to determine issues which require them to view material whose disclosure might 
be contrary to the public interest generally or do harm to national security specifically. This might 
arise, for example, in the adjudication of claims of public interest immunity (‘PII’), or the trying of 
some issue within a closed procedure.79 Coroners, however, are neither vetted nor deemed to be 
so. This has had certain implications in the context of deaths the investigation of which have for 
one or another reason national security ramifications.80 The usual response has been for the 
Coroner step aside and allow the inquest to be carried out instead by a High Court judge appointed 
as a Deputy Coroner for that purpose. On one occasion, however, relating to the death of 
Alexander Perepilichnyy – a Russian businessman who died in what some considered to be 
suspicious circumstances – the Coroner in question refused to do so. The Home Secretary 
therefore declined to disclose the him documentation in respect of which public interest immunity 
was being claimed, instead making a separate PII application to the High Court. The High Court 
allowed this second application, permitting the Home Secretary to refuse to disclose the 
documentation to the Coroner in order for him to judge the first PII application. The Court 
observed that this meant that ‘the Coroner’s position becomes untenable’: 
 
He cannot have sight of relevant, sensitive material which is the subject of the PII ruling. 
To my mind that puts him in a position in which he cannot conduct a full and fair inquest. 
It is for the Chief Coroner to arrange for a replacement who is able to view the sensitive 
material and continue the inquest.81 
 
Even when judges are given specific roles which involve greater than normal access to secret 
material, they do not appear to be vetted. Writing of the Security Commission, Lustgarten and 
Leigh noted that members were not positively vetted upon appointment but that ‘the public 
servants will all have successfully undergone the highest level of vetting whilst in office’. This was 
not true of judges: 
 
The judicial members uniquely are taken on trust, an extraordinary testament to the 
perception of judges and their role in the British system of government. Why particular 
judges receive the Prime Ministerial letter of invitation remains a mystery, but it may be 
not irrelevant to the process that the first chairman, Winn J., had served in naval 
intelligence and that both he and Lord Bridge (member of the Commission 1977-85 and 
chairman 1982-85) had before their elevation been Treasury Counsel.82 
 
It is likely, though impossible to verify, that similar considerations might apply to senior judges 
who have acted as, for example, Commissioners within the national security apparatus – Security 
Service or Intelligence Services Commissioner, perhaps, the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner or, now, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner83 – or who are appointed to the 
various specialist tribunals with a national security remit.   
 
4. Redress for vetting decisions 
 
One key reason for reconsidering the modern security vetting landscape is the inadequacy of the 
mechanisms which exist for challenging adverse vetting decisions. Any reform of the system would 
be required to improve on the system as it currently exists, which this section explains and critiques. 
The possibility of informal or unofficial vetting was discussed in the previous section. One reason 
to object to such practices is that anyone subject to such vetting by definition has no access even 
to the inadequate apparatus discussed in this section. 
 
4.1 The Security Vetting Appeals Panel 
 
In 1997, while issues about the adequacy of remedies in deportation cases were being dealt with 
by the creation of a secret tribunal (SIAC) a similar change was made with the introduction of the 
Security Vetting Appeals Panel (‘SVAP’),84 which replaced the ‘Three Advisers’ in challenges to 
refusal or withdrawal of security clearance. Unlike its predecessor institution, SVAP is available 
not only to civil servants but also to contractors who are the subject of adverse vetting decisions. 
SVAP has, however, never been given a statutory footing of the sort which SIAC (like other 
tribunals which operate in this area) enjoys, and though it is chaired by a retired judge (with retired 
or serving judges acting as deputy chairs)85 it is not a judicial body, does not employ a judicial 
procedure, and does not produce binding decisions: 
 
[SVAP] follows an informal procedure, with hearings confidential to the parties concerned. 
It makes an ‘open’ report of its findings with recommendations to the head of the 
department or organisation involved and copies the report to the appellant. Where the case 
involves sensitive information, the Panel endeavours to provide the appellant with a gist 
of the information, but the need to protect such information means that in such cases a 
separate ‘closed’ report will be made to the head of the department or organisation. The 
Panel can recommend that the vetting decision stand, or that the security clearance should 
be given or restored. It can also comment on the process followed, and can recommend 
that it be re-run. SVAP recommendations are not binding on departments and 
organisations, though in practice they are almost invariably followed.86 
 
In this respect, SVAP represents only a relatively slight departure from the practice of the Three 
Advisers,87 and is certainly quite insufficient on its own to do procedural justice to those whose 
interests are adversely affected by decisions regarding vetting.  
 
Because SVAP is not a judicial body, and does not produce decisions on points of law or 
which are otherwise binding, relatively little is in the public domain about its work.88 It is not 
subject to the Freedom of Information Act and the occasional question in Parliament elicits only 
the response that it is not possible to comment on individual cases.89 A triennial review conducted 
by the Cabinet Office recommended that it be preserved, and shed some light on the body’s work, 
emphasising the distinction between the SVAP and the employment tribunals whose work in this 
area is discussed further below: 
 
While cases may be brought to an Employment Tribunal where refusal or withdrawal of 
clearance leads to dismissal or is challenged on grounds of discrimination, this will not 
apply to all the cases where appeals lie to SVAP, and their roles are fundamentally different. 
An Employment Tribunal’s ability to examine sensitive national security information was 
more limited than SVAP’s until the enactment of the Justice and Security Act 2013. And 
Departments in any event value the relatively informal process followed by SVAP and the 
specific expertise it has developed in considering vetting decisions.90  
 
In many cases, therefore, an individual whose security clearance is withdrawn or refused will be 
able to challenge that decision before the SVAP and then, because it results in a loss of 
employment, before a Tribunal. Because, however, it is only available to those who are already in 
state employment (whether as civil servant or contractor), it provides no remedy to those who are 
prevented from taking up such a post by the refusal of security clearance.91  
 
The Security Vetting Appeals Panel has been considered, only once, by the Court of 
Human Rights. Gulamhussein was an administrative assistance in the Home Office whose security 
clearance was suspended because of, he was told, ‘[a]ssociation with individuals suspected of 
involvement and support for terrorism overseas, in particular the insurgency in Iraq.’92 Both the 
internal process and the SVAP rejected his appeal, the latter recommending that the refusal of 
clearance be withheld and holding – if that is the correct term – that because its ‘rulings’ are not 
binding, that it was not determining Gulamhussein’s civil rights and that, therefore, Article 6 of 
the ECHR was not engaged. When Gulamhussein applied to the Court of Human Rights (his 
application having been joined with that of Mr Tariq, discussed further below) it held that it was 
unnecessary to decide whether the refusal of security clearance involved the determination of his 
civil rights, though the Court hinted at its view in noting that ‘the link between the decision to 
revoke Mr Gulamhussein’s security clearance and his loss of duties and employment was more 
than tenuous or remote’.93 As regards the SVAP, it held that Mr Gulamhussein was in a lose-lose 
situation: if SVAP was determining his civil rights, and so Article 6 was engaged, then it was 
simultaneously fulfilling the requirements of Article 6 by assessing the merits of the decision to 
refuse him clearance. The Court nevertheless held that Article 6 did not apply to the Panel: 
 
Given that the SVAP is staffed by senior members of the judiciary and has access to the 
same evidence under similar procedural rules to the domestic courts, the Court 
acknowledges that its recommendations must be highly persuasive. However, this does not 
amount to their being “directly decisive”… SVAP’s recommendation does not have any 
particular consequence; it makes its recommendation to the relevant Head of Department 
who then takes the final decision concerning security clearance… Therefore the SVAP was 
not able to take a decision that would be “directly decisive for the right in question” and 
so Article 6 did not apply to the proceedings before it.94 
 
This places the SVAP in a privileged position: able to present itself as a judicial body and so to 
influence very strongly (probably definitively) the fate of those subject to adverse vetting decisions 
– and only, it must be remembered, a subset of those – without having to adhere to the 
requirements which would normally apply to judicial bodies. The strength of this point is of course 
impossible to identify precisely without knowing – which we do not – what proportion of SVAP’s 
recommendations are accepted by the Heads of Department to which they are made. 
 
4.2 Legal challenges to vetting 
 
SVAP provides a (sort of) remedy – though partial and inadequate – to those who are the subject 
of negative vetting decisions, but not (we are told) a legal one, and so possibility of legal challenge 
can be considered separately. Amongst the burgeoning body of national security case law in recent 
decades – prompted by, to name only the most obvious factors, the changing security context post 
9/11 and the incorporation of the ECHR into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998 – 
there has been relatively little, and relatively limited, consideration of vetting. There are multiple 
potential routes to a legal challenge on vetting, some of them direct and others indirect.  
 
First, there exists, logically, the possibility of a judicial review on common law grounds of 
a decision to withdraw or refuse security clearance, whether the clearance is to allow the individual 
in question to work directly for a public authority or is being given by such an authority to permit 
the individual to work for a private party. One question about such judicial review will be whether 
or not it requires the applicant to avail herself of the possibility of ‘appealing’ to the SVAP prior 
to bringing such a claim before the relevant court. Normally one is required to make use of any 
right of appeal before making an application for judicial review, but if the UK takes the position 
that Article 6 does not apply to its work, then it would seem to follow logically that SVAP does 
not fall within the category of remedies to which recourse must be made. Nevertheless, a challenge 
to the decision of the original decision-maker to withdraw or refuse clearance, while no doubt 
possible, is highly unlikely to succeed to the extent to which it is based upon considerations of 
national security, to which the courts will apply only a very light touch review. Barring outright 
irrationality, such a claim will no doubt fail. What if a person has brought a judicial review not 
against the decision-maker but against the SVAP that has, later in the process, recommended that 
the decision be upheld? There does not appear to be any examples of applications for judicial 
review being made in respect of the recommendations of the SVAP. Though one was pending in 
the Gulamhusseini case, it was withdrawn after the Supreme Court’s decision in Tariq – presumably 
because the terms of that judgment rendered an Article 6 challenge highly unlikely to succeed – 
notwithstanding that nothing in Tariq speaks directly to the amenability of the SVAP to judicial 
review. The better view must be that it is so amenable, but a successful challenge to its 
recommendations will not necessarily impact upon the decision which follows from those 
recommendations. And so the hurdle is not amenability but rather the grounds on which any 
challenge might be brought. 
 
Where a person has gone before the SVAP and the original decision has remained intact, 
the quality of the procedure employed there will potentially be a ground of a challenge to the 
overall decision. It is thus significant that its procedures do not respect absolutely the principle of 
audi alteram partem. In the 1980s, the decision of GCHQ to withdraw the security clearance of an 
employee who has disclosed to them his homosexuality was held to be amenable to judicial review 
and the process employed held to meet the criteria of natural justice. Here, however, a certain 
amount of factual material had been disclosed to the applicant and his solicitor – disclosure could 
take place without problem specifically because it was he who had informed GCHQ in the first 
place. Had GCHQ taken the view that the material could not have been disclosed on national 
security grounds – as it likely would have if its sources were anything but the applicant himself – 
the judge made clear that this ‘that would be an end of the matter’.95 The more modern approach 
is such that the mere invocation of national security would no longer have quite that effect, but it 
would presumably factor in – along with, crucially, the possibility of an appeal to SVAP – to any 
consideration both of the reasonableness and the procedural requirements of such a decision.  
 
The second route by which challenge might happen is human rights-based claim to the 
vetting. Both the ultimate decision-maker and the SVAP will be public authorities for the purpose 
of the Human Rights Act 1998, though – as discussed above – the specific rights engaged by the 
decisions (of the former) and recommendations (of the latter) may vary. A number of such 
challenges have been brought in the era of the modern national security constitution – an early 
example is Esbester, brought by an individual who had been refused employment at the Central 
Office of Information. Though no reasons had been given, he suspected that the decision related 
to his involvement with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and membership of the CPGB. 
Having made an application to the Security Services Tribunal – a precursor to the Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal – he was informed, as all applicants to that body in fact ultimately were, that no 
determination had been made in his favour. Amongst his complaints was that he had been denied 
the effect remedy that Article 13 of the Convention required him to have. Because, however, his 
logically prior complaint of a violation of Article 8 was held to be manifestly ill-founded (on the 
basis that the Security Service Act 1989 provided adequate legal basis for the interference with his 
rights) the adequacy of the remedy not directly addressed.96 In addition, there exists a possibility 
of bringing a claim in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal alleging that the involvement of the SIAs 
in the vetting process has resulted in a breach under the ECHR. The Tribunal is recognised as 
providing an effective remedy under the EHCR,97 and it has recently been held that a person who 
wishes to bring a claim over which it has jurisdiction before the Court of Human Rights must first 
exhaust his or her domestic remedies, including by making recourse to the IPT.98 Nevertheless, 
the IPT operates on a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ basis and any such challenge is vanishingly 
unlikely to succeed.   
 
 A third possible route of legal challenge – partially overlapping with the second – and to 
which most of the modern case law relates, is to bring an employment law claim relating to the 
outcome of a vetting process – a route which is available as regards both public and private sector 
employers. Here, the challenge can be made either to the relevant employment decision itself or, 
more frequently, the process by which any challenge to it must take place, which has for many 
years been more restrictive than is the normal employment tribunal process. So, for example, 
section 7 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 permits the Secretary of State to make regulations 
regarding proceedings before employment tribunals.99 It further provides that such regulations 
‘may make provision enabling a Minister of the Crown, if he considers it expedient in the interests 
of national security’ to do one of a number of things, including to sit in private, exclude the 
applicant from the proceedings, and keep secret the reasons for its decision.100 In practice, these 
proceedings will be what are described in other contexts as ‘closed material proceedings’ and the 
person so appointed will be is what is known in those contexts as a ‘special advocate’.101 A 
provision inserted into the Act by the Employment Relations Act 2004 provides for the extension 
of these processes into other types of employment proceedings. 102  
 
 Though elsewhere in the legal order, the various international regimes have been a 
reasonably effective weapon against the secrecy engendered by provisions of this nature, the 
application of those regimes to the vetting context has been disappointing. It reflects a persistent, 
and at times rather alarming, belief that the loss of employment is – in relative, but sometimes also 
in absolute terms – a relatively minor interference with the rights of the individual, such that any 
challenge to a decision which results in that loss need not attract the sort of procedural protection 
which applies to more serious such interferences. So, for example, in Tariq, a challenge was brought 
on Article 6 grounds to the use of a closed material procedure in employment proceedings brought 
on the grounds of racial and religious discrimination grounds. The applicant, formerly an 
immigration officer, had seen his security clearance withdrawn after his brother and his cousin 
were arrested on suspicion of involvement in planning a terrorist attack and the latter was 
convicted of related offences. The Supreme Court was required to consider, in effect, whether the 
standard it had set in AF (No 3) – a case relating to control orders, where the intrusiveness of the 
restrictions associated with the control order was such as to render it a deprivation of liberty – 
applied also here. That standard – the ‘AF (No 3) disclosure requirement’ or, more often, the 
‘gisting’ requirement – requires that the person who seeks to challenge the imposition of measures 
restricting his liberty be given ‘sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable 
him to give effective instructions in relation to those allegations’.103 In Tariq, however, the Supreme 
Court held that this requirement did not extend to cases like the those brought by the applicants, 
which were too distant from the context (criminal proceedings) in which the Strasbourg Court had 
first articulated it. Lord Dyson, for example, suggested that while he did not ‘wish to underestimate 
the importance of the right not to be subjected to discrimination’, it was the case that ‘on any 
view’, discrimination was ‘a less grave invasion of a person’s rights than the deprivation of the 
right to liberty.’104 
 
 When Mr Tariq applied to the Strasbourg Court (where his case was joined with that of 
Mr Gulamhussein, discussed above), it – in finding that both his application and a similar one were 
inadmissible because manifestly ill-founded – summarised the relevant principles which apply in 
this context. First, ‘the right to disclosure of relevant evidence is not an absolute right’.105 Article 
6, the right to a fair trial, will be satisfied (in the civil context) where ‘the domestic courts had the 
necessary independence and impartiality; had unlimited access to all the classified documents 
which justified the decision; were empowered to assess the merits of the decision revoking security 
clearance and to quash, where applicable such a decision if it is arbitrary.’106 In its previous case 
law, it recalled, it had also examined whether ‘the domestic courts duly exercised the powers of 
scrutiny available to them, and whether their application of a restricted procedure for reasons of 
security appeared arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.’107 Applying these to the fact of Mr Tariq’s 
case, the Court held that the process by which he had been able to challenge is dismissal was in 
accordance with Article 6 of the Convention, effectively endorsing the two-tier approach which 




Accepting without hesitation that the question of security clearance is of the utmost importance 
in securing the state and its interests against those who might seek to harm it and them, the picture 
which emerges from a consideration of the vetting landscape as it exists in the United Kingdom is 
a somewhat unedifying one. There exists too much uncertainty as to who is vetted, and what can 
be said with certainty reflects if not an incoherence then certainly a series of questionable and 
historically contingent assumptions which should be made manifest and, if necessary, revisited. 
The system by which adverse vetting decisions can be revisited is inadequate, not only because the 
Security Vetting Appeals Panel is a non-curial body which effectively makes decisions of greater 
import than many of those made by courts, but also because it is unavailable to those who are the 
subject of such decisions while not already in the employ of the state. Such persons can be denied 
natural justice, forced to fall back on an expensive judicial review procedure within which they 
might well be denied – compatibly with both EU law and the ECHR – knowledge of even the very 
minimum of the case against them.  
 
As with many issues under the heading of  security, it is perhaps the case that the question 
of vetting attracted (significantly) less attention in a period where the ideological extremes of 
domestic politics were felt to have become blunted, and the primary threat to security was from 
external actors, advancing an ideology to which there was little sympathy on both left and right. If 
that was true once, it would seem no longer to be, as the two examples with which this article 
opened in their own way demonstrate. Not only is the polarisation of politics apparently increasing, 
with that polarisation eventually – but inevitably – finding its way into the state’s institutions, but 
with the increased surveillance powers of the state comes a renewed opposition to those powers 
and their use. This second trend, which would appear to be reflected in the refusal of security 
clearance to Eric King on the basis of his involvement with a range of (broadly) anti-surveillance 
organisations, cuts across the ideological spectrum which the use of vetting powers (if not their 
substance) has always reflected. This return of politics into the vetting arena is, though unwelcome, 
entirely predictable. Though the basic logic of the vetting project – the need to ensure that those 
minded to harm national security are not, as far as can be helped, in a position to do so – is sound 
and largely uncontentious, the reality is that no bright line has ever been or could ever be drawn 
between those factors which speak directly to security and those, on the other hand, which are 
political in nature. Political activity – especially when it takes place outside of the formal structures 
of political parties – very often leads to association with individuals whose politics may be more 
extreme or whose methods may be less palatable. As the political returns to the constitution, 
therefore, in the form of greater ideological diversity than was present, say, between the early 1990s 
and the early 2010s, vetting risks once again becoming a legal tool which effectively but 
surreptitiously frames the field of legitimate political activity. If so, the case for its reform will only 
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